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The current paper provides a thorough analysis of Marks & Spencer’s stock 
performance. The analysis explores the arguments which support a SELL 
recommendation. For the purpose, a detailed analysis of the UK Food and 
Fashion retail industries is conducted, following an overview of the company’s 
historical background and financial performance. The paper places special 
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▪ We initiate coverage of Marks & Spencer (M&S) with a 
SELL recommendation and a Dec-20 TP of 190p (Bull Scenario), 
implying a 10% downside vs the current market price (19-Dec-19).  
▪ The Food sector in the UK is struggling with severe 
competition from European discount retailers. In a scenario in 
which the company is attempting to deviate from a premium image 
and become a “family based shopper”, M&S is at risk of being 
“stuck in the middle”. Additionally, the company’s newly formed 
joint-venture with Ocado presents significant executional risks and 
puts at jeopardy the firm’s credibility to investors, following the 
recent dividend cut to finance the transaction. 
▪ In Clothing & Home (C&H), stores are oversized and 
supply chain allows for both stock piling and low availability. 
Moreover, M&S is struggling to compete with fast-fashion retailers, 
which have a closer connection with the “consumer of the future”. 
We believe C&H’s problems are structural, rather than executional. 
▪ Valuation: our recommendation departs from a DCF 
valuation method, with a WACC of 7.6% and a terminal growth rate 
of 1.5%. Our forecast period extends to 2031. 
▪ Key risks to our analysis: (1) Corporate governance shift, 
(2) Brexit uncertainty, (3) Monetization of properties, (4) Solid 
progression in the cost cutting plan and (5) Better than expected 
like-for-likes in C&H. 
Company description 
Founded in 1884 in Leeds, M&S is the UK’s largest retailer, operating in 
the Clothing & Home (34% UK FY’19 revenues) and Food markets (57% 
FY’19 UK revenues). Organized in two segments – UK and International – 
M&S sees c.10% of its revenues and c.23% of its operating profit 
generated abroad.  
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We conducted a DCF analysis to value M&S. Thus, we forecasted both IS and BS 
items until 2031 (when the company reaches the steady-state). The valuation uses 
a 7.6% WACC and 1.5% growth rate in the Bull scenario1. We obtained a price 














Marks and Spencer (M&S) is one of the UK’s largest retailers, with c.7.6% market 
share in the UK apparel market as of FY’18 (vs 9.6% in FY’08, source: Euromonitor). 
Its Food segment is responsible for 57% of FY’19 revenues and c.48% of FY’19 
UK gross profit (31% gross margin), while its Clothing and Home segment (C&H) 
represents 33% of total FY’19 revenues at a 57% gross margin. Having an 
international footprint, the company operates in two key geographic segments: the 
UK segment (91% of FY’19 rev) and the International segment (9% of FY’19 rev, 
14% operating margin), which incorporates the Republic of Ireland, Europe and 
Asia, together with other international franchise operations.  
A Shifting Core Strategy 
“Don’t ask the price, it’s a penny” – you could read on a market stall in Leeds, back 
in 1884. It was then that Michael Marks, a Polish refugee that was later joined by 
Thomas Spencer, created what is now one of the UK major retailers. Back then, it 
 
1 Since we are recommending a SELL, we present the most optimistic scenario which still supports our investment decision  
 
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis for the Bull Scenario 
In green, price higher than current share price 
6.6% 7.1% 7.6% 8.1% 8.6% 9.1%
0.5% 208 193 181 171 162 154
1.0% 214 198 185 174 165 156
1.5% 222 204 190 178 168 159
2.0% 232 212 195 182 171 161
2.5% 244 220 202 187 175 164
WACC
g
Table 3: Implied Downside Sensitivity for the Bull Scenario 
In yellow, upside higher than -10% 
6.6% 7.1% 7.6% 8.1% 8.6% 9.1%
0.5% -5% -12% -17% -22% -26% -29%
1.0% -2% -9% -15% -20% -25% -29%
1.5% 1% -7% -13% -19% -24% -28%
2.0% 6% -3% -11% -17% -22% -26%
2.5% 11% 1% -8% -15% -20% -25%
WACC
g
Table 1: DCF Valuation and Inputs 
Scenarios: M&S Bull and Ocado Base 2018a 2019a 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e 2026e 2027e 2028e 2029e 2030e 2031e TV
FCF Core 508 726 551 482 406 241 278 259 242 239 246 252 259 266
FCF Non-Core 297 -214 31 31 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Free Cash-Flows 805 512 583 513 454 288 325 306 289 286 293 299 306 314
FCF growth 14% -12% -12% -36% 13% -6% -6% -1% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Discounted Free Cash-Flows 627 513 422 249 261 229 200 185 176 167 159 151 1198
g 1.5%
WACC 7.6%
2021 - 2023 1184 30% Pension/Post Retirement Benefit 642 Equity Value as of Dec-2020 3713
2024 - 2027 875 22% Associates 509 # Shares 1949
2027-2031 653 17% (Net Debt)/Excess Cash -1280
TV 1198 31% Total Adjustments -129 Price Target Dec-2020 190
EV (as of 01/01/2020) 3909 100% Upside/Downside 19/Dec/2019 -13%
Graph 1. Revenue Split as of FY’19 
In m£ 
Source: Company Filings 
Graph 2. Operating Profit Split 
In m£, reported figures 
Source: Company Filings 
 
 








was unimaginable the ups and downs the once Britain’s favourite would face until 
today. 
In 2001, the company hit record-level profit of one billion pounds; however, just 
three years later, we saw its profits fall to 145 million pounds. Since 2015, the stock 
price is declining (Graph 3), and it was observed an increasing number of bears on 
the sell-side, despite the company’s strong FCF yield (Tables 4 and 5). Although 
Brexit’s uncertainty can be to blame now (at least partially), it was certainly not the 
one to blame back in 2015. Operating in two challenging sectors, the company has 
failed to address the problems it encountered thus far. Margin pressure in Food 
and an outdated portfolio in Clothing & Home are two of the many factors that can 
explain M&S’s downfall. But most importantly, underneath them, more structural 
problems can be identified. 
After the appointment of Archie Norman as CEO2, the company entered an 
ambitious and much needed turnaround plan. The question is: is it too late?  
The Past 
Despite its reputation, M&S has a track record filled with struggles. Focusing solely 
on this century, one can find episodes of dividend cuts, business relocations and 
profit warnings. In 2000, the company announced a dividend cut of 40% due to 
increased competition and bad performance in merchandising (current C&H 
segment). In 2001, M&S initiated another programme of relocation, selling its 
International business and firing c.4,000 people. In 2005, M&S issued a profit 
warning following disappointing Christmas sales. In 2008, it announced another 
profit warning following disappointing Food performance and the departure of the 
company’s head of Food. 
Multiple factors are behind M&S’s peaks and valleys. Overall, M&S has lagged 
competition in several occasions. In the 90s, the company struggled in the C&H 
segment as it only sold British manufactured products, while fast-retailers were 
already benefitting from the significant cost savings from producing abroad. In 
2001, the company finally started accepting credit cards; before, it tried to 
incentivise customers to use its Chargecard3 (source: The Guardian), which obviously 
was a failure, in a time when the proliferation of bank credit cards was on its peak. 
In 2010, while competitors were focused on launching initiatives related with the 
online channel, the CEO Marc Bolland announced a transformation plan to 
increase sales by redesigning stores and transforming its supply chain, demanding 
an increase in capital expenditures of £350m – and, even though the 
 
2 5-May-2017, stock +5% on the day  
3 M&S’s own credit card 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Net Debt/EBITDA 1.7x 1.6x 1.5x 1.5x 1.1x
FCF Yield 17% 20% 19% 20% 13%
Table 4. M&S’s cash generation and debt 
position 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
Table 5. Peers’ Cash generation and debt 
position, 2018 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
Graph 3. Stock Performance Jan 2014 -
Dec 2019 








Median UK Food Retail 8.5% 1.1x
Ahold Delhaize 8.9% 2.9x
Carrefour Sa 2.2% 1.7x
Colruyt 1.6% -0.1x
Casino Guichard -3.0% 3.6x
Median European Food Retail 1.9% 2.3x
Next Plc 6.4% 1.2x
Kingfisher Plc -1.0% -0.1x
Sports Direct In n/a 1.2x
Jd Sports Fashio 4.4% -0.8x
Dunelm Group 6.1% 1.0x
B&M European 1.7% 1.9x
Median UK GM Retail 4.4% 1.1x
 
 








transformation plan 2010-2014 was accomplished its goals, its stock performance 
was not stellar.  
While these days the symptoms are different, the patient is still the same; and 
going through the company’s historical performance leads us to question how 
much of the past struggles (which look like a deja-vu of the current situation) are 
currently priced in. 
Present and Future 
“Another five-year plan, still no great leap forward”, announced The Guardian 
following the company’s track record of turnaround plans with a 5-year duration.  
With the recent “Transformation Update”4, the market could finally grasp a sense 
of the “far reaching change at M&S”. The company is currently in the 2nd of a 5-
year turnaround plan, despite the plan for C&H being 18 months behind schedule. 
Divided in three stages (Figure 1): (1) restoring the basics, (2) shaping the future, 
and (3) making M&S special, the company expects to be back on track like in the 
good old days. Cultural transformation is at the epicentre of the change – from the 
top to the bottom, with new names in a newly structured board committee – but the 
company is indeed fighting in several fronts.  
Overall, cost reduction and increasing supply chain efficiency are two key 
milestones for M&S. While H1’205 witnessed some performance improvements, 
M&S is still fighting significant structural problems as we elaborate further. 
Shareholder structure 
As of June 2019, there are 1,949 million M&S shares outstanding, with each 
holding one voting right (Table 5). Additionally, the company’s shares trade as 
American depository receipts, with each receipt representing two shares. M&S 
shares trade on the London Stock Exchange and the company has recently left 
the FTSE100 (c. -10% YTD as of Dec-19), after a 35-year stay – since the index 
inception. 
When compared to its peers, M&S was one of the most rotated stocks in this period 
(Graph 4), reflecting the company’s instability - M&S’s underlying performance 
deteriorating vs the industry makes it more volatile in comparison to its peers. 
In terms of ownserhip, M&S’s top 1 investor holds a stake of 6.4% (Table 5), which 
means that the company is not too dependent on one single investor. Additionally, 
 
4 Investor Presentation 1 October 2019 
5 Stands for first-half year results for 2019/2020 
Figure 1. M&S Transformation Plan Stages 
Source: Transformation Update, 1-Oct-19 
% O/S
BlackRock Institutional 6.39
Schroder Investment Management 4.62
Columbia Threadneedle Investments 4.23
Majedie Asset Management 4.16
RW C Partners Limited 3.96
The Vanguard Group, Inc. 3.37
Bank of Nova Scotia 2.63
Jupiter Asset Management 2.48
W ellcome Trust 2.47
Norges Bank Investment Management 2.37
Table 5. M&S’s Main Shareholders 
% of total shares outstanding 
Source: Reuters 












being mostly owned by institutional investors, we can expect less volatility than if 
held by private investors. 
Overall, despite the high trading volumes, we think that M&S’s shareholder 
structure is sufficiently stable and diversified and we do not expect it to have 
significant influence in our valuation.  
UK Food 
Segment Description 
The Food segment is responsible for 57% of FY’19 revenues (c.63% UK revenues) 
and c.48% of FY’19 UK gross profit, implying a 31% gross margin (Graph 5). Its 
importance has been increasing throughout time, with the company placing greater 
focus in this segment vs C&H. 
Under the Food segment, M&S sells “sustainably sourced, fresh, convenient 
products of outstanding quality” and its spectrum can be split in 5 key offers: protein 
deli and dairy, ambient and in-store bakery, means dessert and frozen, hospitality 
and “Food on the Move”. Moreover, Marks & Spencer offers food via two store 
formats: full-line stores, in which the consumer can have access to both clothing, 
home wear and food; and Simply Food stores, which are smaller and more 
convenient stores, focused on Food. 
For the last 3 years, M&S has been reporting negative LFLs6 in the food segment 
(Graphs 6 and 7) and a declining gross margin (Graph 5). Despite the company 
operating in a challenging Food business, we argue many of the problems derive 
from the company’s very own business model. Our concerns over M&S’s business 
model vs peers lie on the fact M&S was the biggest market share loser vs UK retail 
grocers following its declining performance in terms of LFLs (Graphs 6 and 7). Despite 
some recovery in H1’20 (+0.9% LFL yoy driven by volume) and a positive outlook 
for Christmas spending, especially after the some tailwinds from the UK election, 
we defend the positive yoy performance is mostly driven by soft comps after a 
weak H1’19, with executional problems persisting. 
Stuck in the Middle 
M&S is perceived as a premium grocer (Figure 2). Under the current transformation 
plan, the company is aiming to become a more family-based grocer. To do so, the 
company is opening new Simply Food Stores, becoming closer to the consumer. 
With this strategy, M&S expects to place a greater offer in comparison to its peers 
 
6 Non-IFRS metric commonly used in retail. For M&S, like-for-like stands for the period-on-period change in revenue (excluding VAT) from stores  which 
have been trading and where there has been no significant change (greater than 10%) in footage for at least 52 weeks and online sales 
Graph 5. UK Food Revenues and Gross 
Margin Evolution 
In £k 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
Graph 6. LFLs YoY M&S vs Big 4 
Source: Companies’ Filings, ER Analysis 
Graph 7. Revenue Change YoY 
M&S 












as regular Food stores typically display c.2,000 products. Additionally, the 
company is investing in price and has entered a joint-venture with Ocado, as we 
explain further. By appealing to a more family shopper, M&S expects to see 
consumer’s frequency of purchase increasing, thereby becoming weekly rather 
than a weekend place to shop. While we understand the company’s shift, we are 
afraid M&S ends up “stuck in the middle”, not being perceived neither as a premium 
grocer nor as a food chain. Moreover, becoming a family shopper implies 
intensified competition from the Big 47, moving away from other grocers such as 
Co-Op and Waitrose. In a scenario in which the first compete in a significantly lower 
margin basket, we must raise concerns on M&S’s ability to succeed. 
Store Space 
As of FY’19, M&S has closed 35 full-line stores; in FY’20, the company intends to 
close further 85 full-line stores and 25 simply food stores – “some of the low 
volume, higher cost Simply Food stores, mostly on short leases, will also be 
progressively relocated or rationalised”. With the company in the 2nd of a 5-year 
turnaround plan, space contribution is expected to be negative in the upcoming 
years. 
Supply Chain 
Despite its food suppliers being mainly located in the UK for the Food segment, on 
the contrary to what happens in the C&H segment nowadays, Marks & Spencer’s 
inefficient supply chain has led to high levels of waste and low levels of availability. 
The inefficiency consists of an overweight structure of intermediaries, which is 
publicly recognized by the company. The restructure of the supply chain 
constitutes one of its pillars for future growth – because of this, M&S is currently 
working with Gist and has developed a pilot in its Vanguard major store (which will 
be rolled-out to another 85 stores in FY’20). We defend benefits will become 
tangible in the medium-term following the company’s increasing confidence in its 
ability to meet guindace (which was updated from an overall reduction from 0-1% 
to 1-2%) – despite supply chain costs having increased +3% yoy in H1’20 -, 
reducing pressure in Gross Margins through a reduction in COGS8. 
Price/volume relationship 
M&S is focusing an important part of its food strategy in adjusting price and volume. 
There are some items being sold by unadjusted prices, with the company relying 
heavily in discounting. In 2018, for example, M&S decreased the price of eggs by 
 
7 Big 4: Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda and Morrisons. 
8 Stands for Cost of Goods Sold 
Figure 2. UK Grocery Market Positioning 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
 








18% and saw sales rise by 43%. As reported by the company in several occasions, 
the current strategy is to reduce markdown and implement general price 
reductions, aligning customer perception. 
Across Europe in general and the UK in particular, retailers are using demographic 
information to calculate the maximum price a given costumer is willing to pay for a 
product, both in online and physical stores. The retailers are using the same 
methods as Airbnb or Uber to analyse big data and forecast the consumer 
willingness to pay. Thus, it could be profitable to adjust price in some products. 
However, these adjustments might take significant time and CAPEX9 investments, 
that, if the strategy fails, will result in significant losses for the company. 
Challenging Groceries Market in the UK 
The UK Groceries market is a highly competitive and consolidated market. With a 
customer pool of c.67 million people and an overall expected market value of 
£193.6 billion as of FY’19 (2.4% CAGR 2019-2024, according to IGD), its structure 
is characterized by the dominance of the Big 4 supermarket chains – Tesco, 
Sainsbury’s, Asda and Morrisons -, holding c.67% of the market share (Graph 8) and 
the presence of discounters, such as Aldi and Lidl. In this environment, M&S 
displays greater margins than its peers due to its premium offer and Clothing & 
Home section but lags behind in terms of revenues also because of such 
perception (Table 6). The current outlook for the UK groceries market poses key 
challenges to the industry with (1) the rise of discounters, with the increasingly 
reliance on other European retailers such as Lidl or Aldi, (2) the increase of M&A 
activity, and (3) consumers shifting towards the online channel. 
The Rise of Discounters 
As of 2015, Aldi and Lidl held, respectively, 4.9% and 3.5% market share (source: 
Kantar); as of Sep-19, Aldi has already surpassed Co-operative, being the 5th 
largest player in the UK groceries market with an 8.1% market share while Lidl has 
reached a 6% market share (Graph 9). Such trend is not expected to change in the 
foreseeable future, with IGD estimating discounters alone will contribute to roughly 
£4 of each £10 increase in market value (source: IGD). 
In an industry in which grocery players are particularly hit by higher than expected 
inflation as families rapidly adapt their consumption patterns during 
macroeconomic crisis, higher than expected inflation tends to benefit grocery 
discounters over premium players – placing Aldi and Lidl in a great position over 
Brexit uncertainty and M&S at the end of the line following its premium 
 
9 Stands for Capital Expenditures 
Graph 8. UK Food Groceries Market 
Share Evolution 
Source: Euromonitor 
Graph 9.  Market Share Evolution 
Discounters in the UK 
Source: Euromonitor 
Table 6. M&S EBIT Margins vs Peers 
Source: ER Analysis 
2016 2017 2018 2019
Tesco 2.2% 1.7% 2.3% 2.9%
Morrisons 2.6% 1.9% 2.6% 2.6%
Sainsbury's 3.3% 3.0% 2.6% 2.4%
Median UK Food 
Retail
2.6% 1.9% 2.6% 2.6%
Ahold Delhaize 3.9% 3.4% 2.5% 3.9%
Carrefour Sa 3.2% 3.2% 3.1% 2.5%
Colruyt 5.6% 5.5% 5.2% 5.4%
Casino Guichard 4.6% 3.1% 2.9% 3.3%
Median European 
Food Retail
4.2% 3.3% 3.0% 3.6%
M&S 7.4% 7.4% 6.5% 6.3%
 
 








perception10. Moreover, M&S’s high correlation11 with the UK Consumer 
Confidence Index (Graph 10) confirms our concerns on the potential impact from 
Brexit and the consequences on the overall performance of the stock. On top of 
this, following McKinsey research which concludes that, in the UK, 2,000 items 
generate 40% of total sales, we are forced to conclude retailers have little operating 
manouvre to undercut competition. For M&S, this results in increasing price 
pressure and challenges concerning an already declining gross margin.  
M&A Activity 
Such pressure is further intensified with current M&A trends. For example, Tesco 
acquired Booker, one of UK’s major wholesalers, allowing the company to 
strengthen their logistics and control costs more efficiently (having more flexibility 
to reduce prices vs M&S); and Co-Op acquired the wholesaler Nisa, expanding its 
offer and increasing overall buying power. 
Moreover, with large chains increasing their number of premium lines, M&S may 
put a trait for which it is highly rewarded – its premium offer – in jeopardy, especially 
taking into consideration the easier accessibility of the Big 4 vs M&S, which on 
average have more stores than M&S (Table 7). 
Online and an Ambitious Partnership 
We share KPMG’s idea that the importance of the online channel will never reach 
the same relevance for the food segment as it will for non-food products (source: 
KPMG’s Think Tank); however, we are forced to recognise the importance of the online 
channel for the British consumer, with our hypothesis being confirmed with IGD 
estimates of a 7.5% CAGR 2019-2024 for the online segment vs 7% for 
discounters vs 0.6% supermarkets (Table 8). Indeed, the online channel for food has 
become increasingly relevant for consumers with 29% of the British consumers 
purchasing food or groceries online in 2019 (vs 19% in 2011). Sainsbury’s, Tesco, 
Asda, Morissons, Co-Op and Waitrose already have an online presence. Players 
such as Amazon and Ocado play preponderant roles in this channel, as we 
highlight further. 
Following shifting consumer patterns and its ambition to become a digital first 
retailer, M&S has partnered with Ocado, a British online supermarket founded in 
2000. With a client pool of 580,000 active customers, Ocado operates under a 
business model in which the company holds no stores and provides all the 
 
10 We are aware Aldi, Lidl and M&S share relatively similar operational risks in the sense both depend on external suppliers and operate in several geographies 
other than the UK. The key idea is that in a climate of increasing inflation as would be the one expected in the case of a no-deal Brexit, families’ stagnating 
wages and higher willingness to save would benefit chains which provide to consumers lower prices – as it is the case for Aldi and Lidl. Even in the case of 
M&S lowering prices, customers’ perception would take time to adapt to the new conditions. 
11 62% R-Squared 
Graph 10.  Correlation Revenues and CCI 
Source: ER Analysis 
Table 7. Number of Stores per Brand 
Source: Companies’ Websites, ER Analysis 
2017 2018 2019
M&S 979 1,035 1,043
Tesco 3,739 3,952 3,961
Sainsbury's 1,411 1,423 1,428























deliveries directly from its warehouses. The deal allows M&S to leverage on 
Ocado’s expertise in retail logistics and distribution, with M&S selling its products 
via Ocado’s website, thus reducing the execution risk of entering the online 
channel. We believe the expansion to the online channel is a natural strategic 
objective for M&S. We understand the reasons behind this partnership, since 
Ocado already has a functional business in the online business. However, with 
M&S trading down c.12% on the day of the announcement (vs Ocado +3%)12 
following concerns M&S was overpaying for the JV13, we are forced to pose our 
questions regarding the execution risks of the transaction. 
Terms of the transaction 
Under the JV agreement, M&S is acquiring a 50% stake of Ocado’s UK Retail 
business, entering an agreement with the Solutions business via the Ocado Smart 
Platform. The agreement consists in the payment of a £750m consideration, which 
includes a deferred consideration of up to £187.5m plus interest, upon the meeting 
of targets not disclosed. The transaction will become effective in September 2020. 
To finance the acquisition, M&S proceeded to a 1-to-5 rights issue of £600 million, 
which was 85.14% subscribed. 
Problem #1: Dependency on Waitrose 
Ocado partners with Waitrose since 2002; under the agreement, Ocado supplies 
Waitrose’s products as well as Ocado’s own brand. The partnership is ending in 
September 2020, and, under the conditions of the agreement, the partnership will 
not be renovated, with M&S replacing Waitrose. The partnership with Waitrose 
implies exclusivity, with Ocado being tied to a single food retailer. Cutting the tie 
with Waitrose poses significant risks both on the supply and on the demand sides.  
On the supply side, 90% of the products sold via Ocado are Waitrose’s or sourced 
via Waitrose (Graph 11). M&S’s line does not have the same range as Waitrose’s – 
M&S totals c.7,000 lines, whereas a typical supermarket would have c.25,000 lines 
(Tesco has c.30,000 lines and is the #1 in online grocery), so guaranteeing a 
smooth transition can prove difficult if M&S does not manage to develop its product 
lines. Moreover, given M&S is seen as a more premium grocer than Waitrose (Graph 
11), this could impact significantly the value per basket of the delivered products - 
especially if the increase in prices is passed to the consumer. If the company is 
not able to offer discounts or reduce prices, Ocado can suffer a significant increase 
in logistics costs, despite its lean logistics model.  
 
12 27-Feb-2019 
13 For further evidence on Ocado’s valuation, please read Beatriz Leite’s individual report: How to Price-In Ocado? 
Graph 11.  Ocado’s Portfolio 
Source: Ocado’s Earnings Call, ER Analysis 
 
 








In its turn, the supply problem leads to a demand problem. There is no evidence 
of a correlation between Waitrose’s products and Ocado’s sales. However, if the 
consumer proves to be loyal to Waitrose brand, switching costs in the industry are 
low enough for the consumer to start buying via waitrose.com, leaving Ocado. 
Problem #2: Dividend Cut 
Following the announcement of the JV with Ocado and the rights issue, M&S 
announced a dividend reset of 40% from 18.7p to 13.p (Graph 12) to what the 
company considers a “sustainable level”, following its “upcoming debt repayments 
and pension obligations”. We are forced to express concerns over the signals 
cutting DPS sends to the market as (1) a stable pay-out ratio in a mature company 
such as M&S exhibits how financially healthy the company is and (2) given the 
amount of years still ahead for the current turnaround plan, investors are now less 
compensated to wait for the upturn of the company. With the company not cutting 
dividends since 2010, the stock performance on the day of the announcemnt can 
be considered reasonable. 
Problem #3: M&A risks and increasing competitiveness 
In 2018, there were rumours Amazon approached John Lewis Partnership 
regarding a possible acquisition of Waitrose, its grocery chain, but no confirmation 
was provided by the companies. With the ending of the partnership between Ocado 
and Waitrose, we see potential for Amazon and Waitrose reinitiating talks. Key 
catalysts for closing a deal are (1) Waitrose’s physical stores and (2) similarities of 
the customer base - consumers that are willing to pay more to receive quality 
groceries at a convenient timing. 
In 2015, Amazon launched the Amazon pantry service, which allows Prime 
members to receive goods within 24 hours not paying a delivery fee, and to have 
special discounts; later in 2016, the company launched Amazon Fresh in London, 
which allows members to pay no delivery fees in groceries orders. However, its 
performance in the UK groceries market is still very modest: Amazon has entered 
the brick-and-mortar business via the acquisition of Whole Foods. However, due 
to the existence of only 7 Whole Food’s physical stores in the UK, Amazon’s 
success is still very limited, as it is mostly restricted to the London area and 
surroundings. Waitrose’s c.350 stores make it an attractive target for Amazon 
further develop its presence in the UK grocery market. Additionally, as recognized 
by David Jinks, head of consumer research at ParcelHero (source: Packaging News), 
“Waitrose’s generally well-heeled customer base would be a great fit for Amazon”, 
with Waitrose typical consumer willing to spend extra to receive quality groceries. 
Graph 12. Dividend per Share 
In pences 
Source: Company Filings 
 
 








Given Amazon’s brand name, operational leverage and expertise, such 
partnership could reveal to be a game changer for M&S, increasing competition in 
the online channel as well as reducing the return of what we estimate it was an 
already expensive investment in Ocado14. 
Problem #3: Small basket size 
Marks & Spencer’s basket size15 is c.£20 which contrasts with Tesco’s c.£100 
basket size and Ocado’s at c.£100. With Ocado replacing its products to Waitrose, 
Ocado’s basket size is likely to decrease; as such, we must raise questions on the 
economics of the deal, especially given the significant costs associated with home 
delivery (such as fuel consumption, investments in motorbikes, among others). 
Problem #4: Own store cannibalization and gross (not net) synergies 
We also pose questions regarding store cannibalization and the synergies as 
guided by M&S, but recognize the lack of data at this point that could support our 
arguments. By incorporating its offer in Ocado’s website, we can observe potential 
cannibalization of M&S’s current offer. Additionally, the £70m gross synergies16 
(not net) resulting from the JV (1% of M&S’s FY’19 revenues) as guided by M&S 
might imply further investments, hence having little impact on the company’s P&L. 
Problem #5: Online groceries sales growth stabilization 
Between 2010 and 2016, the percentage of British who purchase groceries online 
increased (Graph 13). We defend the percentage of online sales for food will never 
reach apparel’s, and this can lead us to to the conclusion the steady state for online 
food sales can be relatively close, limiting the upside for M&S - another late-entry 
for M&S. In a sector where consumer loyalty is important, the consumers might 
already be tied to other brands, resulting in more obstacles to the company. 
Competition from Food Delivery Apps 
By partnering with Ocado, M&S will have access to Zoom17, a one-hour London, 
low delivery fees, service. Under this new partnership, “food of M&S (ready meals, 
quality food) is perfectly suited for this more upmarket convenience shopping”. 
While we understanding the opening to a new market could imply potential upside, 
our argument is that such potential is limited given the overall consolidation of the 
market.  
 
14 For further evidence on Ocado’s valuation, please read Beatriz Leite’s individual report: How to Price-In Ocado? 
15 Retail metric used to refer to the number of items getting sold in a single purchase 
16 Guidance provided in the Press Release: Bringing the Best Together: Transforming UK online grocery shopping M&S and Ocado announce new Joint 
Venture, 27-Feb-19 
17 For more information on Zoom, please visit: https://zoom.ocado.com/ 
Graph 13. Share Individuals Buy 





Delivery Price Delivery Slot
Ocado £40
£2.99 - £6.99 or free on 
Wednesdays
1h
Iceland £25 £2 - £4 or free over £35 2h
Waitrose £60 Free 1h
Tesco £25 £1 - £7 + £4 if spend <£40
1h but 4-
hour window
Morrisons £40 £1.5 - £5 1h
Sainsbury's £25
£1 - £7 or free delivery with spend 
over £100 on Mon-Thu after 2pm
1h
Asda £40 £1 - £6.50 2h
Amazon Pantry £15 £3.99 1day
Aldi Alcohol £0 Free over £20 or £2.95 if below 1h
Table 9. UK Delivery Offer 
Source: This Is Money 
 
 








A combination of factors leads us to conclude M&S will be facing competition from 
other players besides the traditional food grocers. Being highly rewarded for its 
premium meal options, its integration in Ocado in general and Zoom in particular 
will bring new competitors, from different fronts: (1) on one side, online grocers 
such as Waitrose and Amazon Fresh (Table 9 exhibits other players and its offer); 
(2) on the other side, food delivery apps (with the industry experiencing double-
digital growth (source: Deloitte)) such as Just Eat, Deliveroo and Uber Eats. Following 
this, despite having access to a larger market, M&S is also exposed to fiercer 
competition for what could be a relatively small reward. 
UK Clothing & Home 
Segment Overview 
Clothing & Home incorporates Womenswear, Menswear, Lingerie, Kidswear and 
Home, sold via M&S stores and its online website M&S.com; in total, clothing 
corresponds to 90% of the segment and generates 37% of UK revenues at c.57% 
gross margin (Graph 14). The company is widely known for its position in the UK’s 
underwear market and as a jean retailer18. Moreover, M&S holds 20% in women 
knitwear and 25% of kids have acquired a uniform from M&S.  
While we recognize the problems in the Food segment are more company-specific 
than industry-wide, we defend these are executional, rather than structural. Our 
investment case for the C&H segment does not share the same idea. M&S’s offer 
is outdated and no longer represents a competitive offer in the minds of the 
millenials; this, combined with an inefficient supply chain, that fails to address those 
who decide to buy, is the perfect recipe for a declining performance.  
Not that Fast Fashion 
In 2016, the company’s target consumer were women with ages between 40 and 
55. Recognizing it failed to target the “customer of the future”, jeopardizing its long-
term sustainability, M&S is now targeting a “younger family age customer”. Under 
its turnaround plan, the brand has proposed itself to (1) improve fit and size ratios, 
(2) remove outdated styles and (3) reduce options in 10%, placing greater focus in 
their top-sellers. Indeed, M&S has finally recognized the need to adjust its 
collections and increase its popularity (after seeing its Buzz score19 falling from 
10.2 to 4.8 form FY’17 to FY’18 (Graph 15) vs Aldi at 18.7%, Lidl at 13.8% and 
Morrisons at 8.1%). However, with the current turnaround plan lagging 18 months 
 
18 Steve Rowe on H1’20 Earnings Call: “I think what we've shown is where we focused probably on our number one categories, we can see growth and 
we've got record market share in bras at 37.2%, we're number one in jeans at 12% and grew by just over 30% this autumn” 
19 Buzz or Net Sentiment generated across all media (advertising, news, word of mouth), computed by YouGov via a survey 
Graph 14. UK C&H Revenues and Gross 
Margin Evolution 
In m£ 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
Graph 15. Buzz Score Evolution for M&S 
Source: YouGov – BrandIndex, via Statista 
 
 








behind as reported in the H1’20 earnings call, the success of such strategy is yet 
to be proven, especially after reporting -5.5% yoy LFL for C&H in H1’20. 
Additionally and given consumers preferences towards “faster” fashion retailers, 
such as Primark and Zara, M&S might be too late to recover in this segment. 
Indeed, Associated British Food’s Primark has been among the top retail winners 
in terms of market share as millenials no longer wish to buy clothes where their 
parents and grandparents did – this is, in places such as M&S.  
First Price, Right Price 
Price is considered more important than quality for the UK consumer (source: Kantar, 
Graph 16) when buying clothes. According to our analysis, M&S is the 2nd cheapest 
brand in casual menwear and places in line with the median in womenwear (Table 
10). Although prices are not the lowest of the analysed peer set, they are relatively 
aligned with peers – hence, we find it difficult to blame price for its declining 
performance. Thus, the strategy of adjusting fit and improve look analysed before 
might make sense to align customer’s perception; however, we believe potential 
upside is limited due to overall industry’s trends (as we emphasize next).  
Store and Space  
Marks & Spencer holds a large and outdated store estate. A store closure 
programme (implying the closure of 85 stores) is already underway as about ¾ of 
the C&H stores were opened 25 years ago, with c.75% of those existing before 
WWII. Under this programme, M&S can finally consider to renegotiate leases and 
rethink potential current cannibalization between stores. With the company’s 
problems with inventory management (Table 11), a large store space means 
accumulating inventory that is not consumer’s best picks; which results in the 
company’s reporting problems with stock piling and further inefficiencies. In 
specific, M&S’s average store size is c.37,000 vs Next’s 16,000 sq ft, evidencing 
the brand’s large store size. 
As such, one would expect the closure/reduction of store space could lead to an 
overall cost reduction per store. Following this, we can expect some losses in 
revenues deriving underperforming stores being shut-down, despite some transfer 
of sales to current “regular” stores – implying that space contribution is likely to be 
negative in the upcoming years (as guided by the company).  
While M&S has defined an overall store closure/space reduction strategy, we 
question its contradictions, with M&S opening a 60,000 sq ft store (as a comparison 
metric, a typical H&M store has c.20,000 sq ft (source: MarketWatch)) in Nottingham 
Giltbrook Retail Park and its new store in Corwall – for these stores to prove 
Graph 16. Most important factors when 
buying fashion items in the UK 2015 
Source: Kantar, via Statista 
Table 10. Price Comparison vs Selected Peer 
Group 
Source: Companies’ Websites, ER Analysis 
Casual Wear 
Men
M&S Zara H&M Next Primark
White T-shirt 6 5.99 3.99 5 2
Black Jumper 16 19.99 19.99 18 10
Denim Jeans 15 29.99 17.99 14 10
Total 37 55.97 41.97 37 22
Diff vs M&S 51% 13% 0% -41%
Me dia n 3 7
Ave ra ge 3 9
Casual Wear 
Women
M&S Zara H&M Next Primark
White T-shirt 4.5 4.99 3.99 5.5 4
Black Cardigan 15 19.99 8.99 13 5.5
Denim Jeans 15 19.99 9.99 14 10
Total 34.5 44.97 22.97 32.5 19.5
Diff vs M&S 30% -33% -6% -43%
Me dia n 3 3
Ave ra ge 3 1
2017 2018 2019
M&S 171 178 178
Debenhams 59 62 62
Next 63 62 64
Asos 110 113 123
Table 11. Days Sales Inventories: M&S vs 
Selected Peer Group 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
 
 








successful, a more efficient inventory management and increased availability are 
vital for these mega stores to bear fruit. Otherwise, building these will be just about 
bringing more outdated clothing, in a store that provides little valuable consumer 
experience20. 
Inefficient Supply Chain 
On one side, M&S uses processes in which products with the same origin and 
destination are transported via 2 separate shipments. On the other side, the stock 
is often not adjusted for the store size and customer demand, increasing inventory 
levels, leading to high days’ sales inventory in comparison to its peers, 
demonstrating the firm’s inefficiency (Table 11) - a problem for a seasonal industry 
such as apparel. As such, M&S simultaneously displays problems concerning 
stock piling and low availability21. Under the current turnaround plan, M&S expects 
to reduce UK operating costs by 1-2% (Table 12) with the reduction of complexity 
and working capital; and to expand the Bradford distribution centre and improve 
capabilities of its Castle Donnington centre. Overall, M&S is trying to centralize its 
operations, closing warehouses and distribution centres spread around the UK, 
expanding the most important ones, thus reducing supply chain complexity and 
increasing efficiency. While we recognize the importance of such programme, our 
belief is that reshaping its supply chain is necessary not to thrive, but rather to 
survive, in an industry in which fast-retailers are constantly undercutting the time it 
takes to bring products from the warehouse to the store. 
Fast-Moving UK Apparel Market 
M&S holds c.7.6% of market share in the UK Apparel and Footwear Market, being 
the largest retailer by sales. The company is followed by ABF’s Primark (7.0%), 
Next (6.6%), Arcadia Group (3.8%) and Asda (3.5%). Even though placing first in 
the non-food retail market sounds encouraging, M&S has been losing market 
share in the last years (Graph 17). Furthermore, Kantar data also revealed that, on 
average, M&S sales have decreased -5.7% in the last 12 months ending October 
vs the average of the sector at -1.8%, emphasizing our argument that M&S is 
underperforming peers. Regardless, UK fashion retailers have been struggling with 
(1) shifting consumer preferences, (2) declining performance of High Street22 
stores and (3) increasing importance of kidswear and menswear, with M&S lagging 
behind its peers. 
 
20 According to 2018/2019’s Annual Report, up to 50% of our store estate has not had major cosmetic refurbishment in the last  10 years – with M&S placing 
little focus on in-store customer experience 
21 The company has reported the failure to provide clients’ favourites in store while simultaneously filling the store with outdated models, only due to its large 
size 
22 Designation for the concept of the primary business street of towns or cities 
UK Food
Space Contribution Level
Gross Margin Change -25bps to +25bps
UK Clothing & Home
Space Contribution c.-2
Gross Margin Change -75bps to -25 bps
Others
UK Operating Costs (%) c.-1 to -2
Tax rate (%) c.23
Capital Expenditure (£m) 300 to 350
Table 12. Company Guidance FY’20 
Source: Company Filings 












The Online Channel (Again) 
The online channel represented 25% of total apparel and footwear sales as of 
Dec’18 vs 16% Dec’13, respectively (Graph 18). While these trends favour UK pure-
online based retailers such as Boohoo and Asos, or Next (which now has 50% of 
sales sourced via its online channel), traditional retailers that have a relative 
smaller online presence end up getting lost in the crowd. For M&S, the online 
market was flat yoy in H1’2023, with +8% traffic volume being offset by the costs of 
paid search; hence, despite its increasing focus on the online channel, the 
company still fails to materialize this channel in a cost-efficient manner, a common 
challenge for traditional brick-and-mortars. Additionally, according to a survey from 
BDO, UK consumers report they are spending more on experiences rather than 
‘things’, which in an industry in which switching costs are close to zero, is reflected 
in a more elastic demand (and decreased consumer loyalty).  
Modest Presence on Social Media 
Another aspect that signals the overall hypothesis M&S is outdated in comparison 
with its peers and the mistakes M&S made in defining its target consumer, lies on 
the Group’s disappointing presence on social media. With the online bringing c. 
playing an important role for decision making in the fasion industry, M&S’s reach 
is limited (Table 13). The relatively small online presence could signal the limited 
upside potential from its focus in the online channel. 
Declining performance of High Street Stores 
High Street stores are facing difficult times. The previously mentioned shift in 
consumer preferences has led to c.10% decline in footfall24 in the last 7 years 
(source: Springboard). Additionally, brick-and-mortars are struggling with increasing 
business rates and other operating costs. In comparison, traditional brick-and-
mortars pay 2.3% of revenues in business rates vs the 0.6% online retailers (source: 
Retail Research), impacting negatively its cost base. According to PwC, M&S is the 
4th highest payer (among 100 surveyed) of business rates in the UK, which again 
places the company in a challenging position. A further increase in operating costs 
for players is expected following Brexit new tariffs and visas and is likely to 
contribute to (i) rising labour costs and (ii) rising sourcing costs. As such, while we 
expect the current turnaround plan is significantly reshaping M&S’s cost 
structure25, a further deterioration of the High Street can bring more pressure to it. 
 
23 As of FY’19, Online represented c.18% of total UK C&H revenues 
24 Retail metric used to refer to the number of people entering the store 
25 As evidenced in the H1’20 earnings release with management improving costs guidance from 0-1% decline to 1-2% decline for FY’20 and overall 
improvement in UK operating costs vs H1’19 at -3.3% yoy 
Table 13. Social Media Presence: M&S vs 
Selected Peer Group 
‘000 followers 









Graph 18. Clothing, footwear & 
accessories: share of offline & online 
sales UK 2010-2020 
Source: via Statista 
 
 








Menswear and sportswear – the new stars 
While Euromonitor states menswear and sportswear have been the top performers 
as of FY’18, BDO forecasts volume growth will remain low, especially due to 
womenswear. M&S currently holds c.14% market share of the suits category while 
it only holds 2% of the activewear industry, which is growing at +6% yoy (Table 14). 
This focus on outdated categories is another evidence M&S has again lagged 
competition, failling to address customer needs.   
International 
Operating via owned and franchised stores, the International segment allows M&S 
to have access to the European, Middle East and Asian markets (and through the 
online channel, to the US and Australia), holding a total of 444 stores and 
generating c.10% of the Group’s total revenues as of FY’19 (Graph 19) – with owned 
stores representing c.44% of total International revenues in FY’19 vs c.74% in 
FY’17. 
The company’s current international strategy focuses on shifting to a franchise-
dependent model, backing strong partnerships with franchisees, closing 
underperforming, owned, stores and reducing its selling space (FY’19: 4.9m sq ft 
vs FY’15: 6.0m sq ft). Simultaneously, the company has been adopting a market 
pricing strategy, which consists in an overall reduction of prices of c.10% that has 
yielded positive results as sales were up c.8% in FY’19, following a c.+20% 
increasing in volumes (Graph 20). 
Under the new transformation plan, the company is focused on increasing 
efficiency in logistics in the International segment. As such, M&S is increasing food 
stock in EU markets and building a warehouse outside Paris; additionally, amid 
fears over Brexit, the Group has been preparing itself to flow products from Ireland 
- this is being done with the objective of increasing fulfilment rates and 
consequently create more buzz over seasonal launches. 
In the International segment, the top performing market is India, where M&S 
operates since 2001 and partners with Reliance Retail via a JV partnership, and 
where it plans to expand in the upcoming years. India is becoming increasingly 
important. Supported on the country’s positive macroeconomic outlook – with a 
middle class expected to expand by c.14% yoy between 2018 and 2022 (source: 
McKinsey), the country is an interesting opportunity for retailers. The fashion retail 
market’s CAGR 2018-2023 is estimated to be 14.4% and the market is expected 
to reach $59.3 billion in 2022 vs the UK market at $65 billion of 2022 (source: Statista). 
Greece has also been a key driver of the International segment; however, with a 
Table 14. M&S’s Market Growth vs 
Market Share In Top Fashion Sections 







Casual Tops 6% 5%
Activewear 6% 2%
Graph 20. Market Right Pricing 
Impact FY’19 
Source: Company Filings 
Graph 19. International Revenues and 
Operating Margin 
Source: Company Filings 
 
 








fashion retail industry CAGR 2020-2023 at 0.4%, we do not expect major upside 
for M&S, especially as the company has already a relatively established position 
in the country, operating since 1990. 
While we recognize the good performance in FY’19, the strategy for the 
International segment is still “all-over-the-place”, with revenues fluctuating 
significantly across the period of analysis (Graph 19). With the company providing 
little guidance for FY’20 and following the disappointing performance in H1’20 (with 
revenues down 1.7% yoy), it is still unclear what to expect from the segment. 
M&S Bank 
The group has an economic interest in M&S Bank which entitles it to a 50% share 
of profits of M&S Bank, allocated to the UK’s operating profit (4.6% of M&S 
operating profit FY’19). Under this name, Marks & Spencer provides banking 
services, via a partnership managed by HSBC. Such financial services include 
credit cards, savings accounts, mortgages and personal loans, with customers 
accessing these services online or via in-store branches and bureaux. 
The Bank is clearly not part of the core business of M&S, and it has been losing 
share in the Group operating profit since FY’17 (Graph 21). This partnership was 
created to improve customer experience, allowing clients to use special credit 
cards on their purchases, and has not proved to be vital for the business success. 
Following the lack of guidance, the segment is likely to suffer little transformation 
in the upcoming years. 
M&S Energy 
Since September 2018, M&S has been partnering with Octopus, after ending the 
relationship with SSE in the Energy segment; under this agreement, M&S operates 
a fully renewable energy source provider. We fail to understand the strategic 
rationale of the partnership; however, given the imaterial impact for current 
performance (as of FY’19, the unit represented 0.1% of the Group’s total operating 
profit) and the little colour provided by the company regarding its future (especially 
under its current turnaround plan), we do not expect major turnarounds deriving 
from this segment.  
Key Catalysts 
Many recognize M&S is in an endless turnaround; nonetheless, the existence of 
catalysts for further share price decreases may seem less evident. We highlight 
Graph 21. Share of M&S Bank Op. 
Profit in Group Op. Profit 
Source: Company Filings 
 
 








three possible catalysts: (1) further deterioration in Clothing & Home, (2) Brexit 
events and (3) developments following Ocado’s integration. 
We expect further deterioration in the C&H division and our valuation recognizes 
the stock is yet to incorporate its deteriorating outlook and market share losses. 
While it is still unkown what events could drive any further deterioration, stronger 
than expected performance from competitors can bring more downside to the 
stock. As such, we encourage investors to monitor closely peers’ upcoming 
earnings releases. Additionally, we recognize the current turnaround plan is not 
comparable to any other in the past. However, with the objectives for C&H being 
18 months behind schedule, and following the disappointing performance of the 
division in H1’20, we expect the stock to be down post the next earnings release.  
On its behalf, Brexit will bring pressure to M&S’s topline and bottomline. Regarding 
topline, and in line with what was previously mentioned, Brexit is likely to bring 
inflationary pressure (source: PwC), something that would be reflected in deferred 
consumption. As for bottomline, one would expect that, with constrained borders, 
less migrants would flow to the UK (migrants represent 18% of the workforce in 
the UK (source: Migrant Observatory)); on top of this, customs duties over products are 
expected to increase, pressuring M&S’s supply chain. Additionally, such supply 
chain can see the time associated with the process of bringing products to shelves 
becoming more long-lasting, following all trade constraints. Unexpected events 
surrounding Brexit can bring the stock down. While we recognize the overall UK 
market is likely to underperform following these announcements, the deteriorating 
performance of the business can lead M&S to show little resilience vs its peers, as 
it combines structural problems with an unfavourable macroeconomic context.  
Upcoming Ocado’s earnings releases and developments following the partnership 
can also be catalysts for the stock. With the integration starting in September 2020, 
after the ending with Waitrose partnership, we should expect updates soon on the 
success of the integration of the two services. Even in a situation in which Ocado 
represents little of M&S’s revenues, we expect the market to react significantly to 
upcoming announcements (on the day the partnership was confirmed M&S’s stock 
was down c.12%). 
Overall, we believe risks are set to the downside rather than to the upside in the 
upcoming 12 months. 
Risks to the Upside 
Corporate Governance Shift 
 
 








Mr. Rowe has admitted in the past M&S’s culture is “siloed, slow and hierarchical” 
with bureaucry leading to inefficiencies and dragging the company down. However, 
we are aware M&S is undergoing a serious cultural transformation with Mr. Rowe 
building an elite team (Table 15).  
Despite the absence of a new appointed CFO after the resignation of Mr. 
Humphrey Singer 3-days after M&S dropping the FTSE 100 (M&S was one of the 
founding members of the index), the new Heads of C&H and Food have a strong 
reputation in the industry. After the resignation of Jill McDonald, C&H managing 
director, M&S announced he would be succeeded by Richard Price former Tesco 
F&F director; and Stuart Machin, ex-Sainsbury’s, is leading the Food division. With 
all the fresh blood, we believe this transformation plan might not look like any other 
in the past, yielding positive results for the company. 
Brexit Uncertainty 
As reported by the company, we understand M&S is preparing for a no-deal 
scenario. Regardless, following the stock’s correlation with the UK Consumer 
Confidence, we expect it to reflect the outcomes of the Leave decision. Specifically, 
on 18-Oct-19, after a week of positive newsflow when it concerns to Brexit, a deal 
between the UK and EU was announced and the stock was up +5% from the 9th 
to the 18th. As such, we are aware the stock has performed positively greatly due 
to the more favourable macroeconomic context. Such fact is not odd; what is 
questionable is the stock’s performance after the announcement of a new law to 
ensure the Brexit transition phase is not extended on 20-Dec-2019 – with the stock 
down c.-1.2%. Our concerns lie on the fact the market might be overestimating 
announcements that are positive for the economy, and underestimating the ones 
that are not, distorting the stock’s price in the sense it does not represent the 
fundamental value of the company. While we understand the limitations of the 
argument, as we are ignoring many other variables, we do not think this factor can 
be be left out when analysing potential risks.  
Monetization of Properties 
The closure of stores can bring opportunities to M&S. While it is not certain the 
outcome for the closed stores, there is potential for the company to monetize such 
properties, by selling or renting them, especially after the appointment of a new 
Property Development Director in FY’19 with the objective to “unlock value” from 
the portfolio. 
Solid Progression in the Cost-Cutting Programme 
Chairman  Archie Norman
CEO  Steve Rowe
CFO  Humphrey Singer 
Head of Food  Richard Price
Head of C&H  Stuart Machin
Table 15. Board Composition 
Source: Company Website 
 
 








Management has reported £75m cost savings in H1’20 and raised cost savings 
target in FY’20 from 0-1% of operating costs to 1-2% (Table 12), expressing obvious 
confidence in the success of its transformation plan. The company has attributed 
cost savings to changes in the scale of its offices and announced it expects further 
cost savings in H2’20 with the development of the store closure programme. 
Management’s confidence and the reported cost savings can have a material 
impact in the stock’s performance. Despite the strong results and as expressed 
before, we expect top-line deterioration will more than offset the targeted cost 
savings. 
Better than expected LFLs in C&H 
As of HY’20 results, the company reported full price and planned promotional sales 
growth of +2.7% for October. If space were to represent roughly c.-2% of growth, 
this would imply +4-5% LfL growth for the month. If this trend were to be maintained 
throughout the rest of the half-year, our estimates would suffer significant changes. 
However, despite these encouraging numbers, the positive performance is 
relatively in line with the industry growth for the same month, which presents the 
fastest annual growth rate since April (source: Kantar, Table 16). 
 







Food revenues are estimated departing from two key drivers: (1) store/space 






26 We present performance for the three scenarios outlines, as explained below. If not clear, please consider we are referring to the Bull Scenario  
Table 16. UK Fashion Market Sales Change YoY 
Source: Kantar 
Oct/18 Nov/18 Dec/18 Jan/19 Feb/19 Mar/19 Apr/19 May/19 Jun/19 Jul/19 Aug/19 Sep/19 Oct/19
UK Market -1.5% -1.9% -1.3% -0.7% -0.3% 1.1% -0.8% -1.8% -4.0% -3.5% -2.4% -3.0% -1.7%
M&S -2.4% -4.8% -5.0% -7.0% -5.3% -4.3% -3.0% -5.4% -8.1% -8.2% -5.6% -9.7% -3.7%
Next -1.7% -1.6% -1.5% -1.4% -0.4% 1.2% 0.5% 0.4% -2.0% -0.6% 1.0% -0.3% -0.4%
Primark 2.0% 2.6% 1.7% 2.2% 2.7% 7.4% 5.4% 6.4% 0.8% 0.7% 3.5% 2.9% 2.8%
Debenhams -1.8% -0.9% -1.3% -2.6% -2.6% -2.1% -6.6% -11.0% -15.5% -14.4% -13.6% -14.0% -16.1%
Zara -9.3% -7.5% -2.3% 6.6% 2.3% -1.1% -6.7% -5.3% 4.6% 7.2% 4.3% 2.0% 3.7%
H&M -8.5% -6.4% -2.5% 3.2% 1.9% 11.8% 12.8% 14.1% 8.0% 8.5% 6.3% 10.0% 6.5%
Arcadia Group -10.4% -15.3% -16.6% -14.5% -10.9% -5.1% -11.3% -14.5% -13.6% -14.1% -18.8% -16.3% -15.9%
Graph 22. UK Food Revenue 
Drivers, Bull Scenario 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
 










To assess the impact of space in food revenues, the number of stores and its size 
were estimated. The company is guiding for the net closure of 15 stores (i.e., total 
number of stores after the opening of new larger Simply Food stores formats and 
the closure of c.85 full-line stores) for FY’20. Assuming, on average, store size is 
declining following the company’s current store closure programme until 2023, it is 
possible to obtain an average store size of c.9,000 sq ft for mixed used stores and 
7,000 for simply food stores. Assuming the productivity from space27 is the same 
as in the previous year, we are able to obtain the impact from changes in space. 
Given the overall reduction in space until FY’23, we forecast negative space 
contribution until FY23, stabilizing to zero from then ownards. 
Like-for-Like 
To assess the performance of retained stores, we consider volume and price. 
Assuming price is growing roughly at inflation rate, volume will be driving revenues. 
To obtain the volume contribution, we estimate an average volume contribution for 
current lines based on historical data. As for new lines, we assume the company 
will be increasing the number of lines each year, reaching c.8,100 lines, placing 
M&S closer to the remaining food chains. Such assumption is aligned with the 
company’s strategy of (1) increasing its offer following its integration in Ocado and 
(2) becoming closer to an everyday place to shop. As it would not be reasonable 
to assume all lines are materialized into sales, we consider a penetration rate, 
variable in the analysed period (Graph 23). 
Clothing & Home Revenues 
In the case of Marks & Spencer, space contribution and like-for-like are the key 









Graph 23. UK Food LFL Evolution, 
Bull Scenario 
Source: ER Analysis 
Graph 24. UK C&H Change YoY per 
Driver, Bull Scenario 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
 









We have identified two types of stores: underperforming and regular ones. As 
reported by the company, M&S is struggling with oversized stores and small 
assortment, with management focusing on (1) reducing the number of stores and 
(2) reducing selling space. For these reasons and following the recent H1’20 
earnings call, our Bull case assumes M&S will be closing 110 stores in the 
upcoming years – until 2027. At the same time, we forecast a decline in the 
average selling space for C&H stores, which is aligned with the company’s 
guidance for 2019/2020. The overall reduction in size takes into consideration 
M&S’s focus on top-sellers, reducing the already small portfolio of products, hence 
demanding less store size. For each of the types of stores, an average sales 
density was determined, with underperforming stores being 45% less productive 
than regular stores in FY’19. With these variables, space contribution is simply 
computed as the number of closed stores times the average sales density. 
Like-for-Like 
Like-for-like is estimated based on the number of remaining stores and densities. 
On top of this, we add the impact of online, which stabilizes in 2027 when it 
represents c.45% of C&H sales (Graph 26), with the company reaching its 2023’s 
objective to have 1/3 of its C&H sales generated online. Still, it would be naïve not 
to account for synergies from the stores closure - M&S recognizes the proximity 
between stores; hence, we assume regular stores will recapture of 20% of the 
sales closing stores’ revenues, in line with management’s guidance on the last 
earnings call.  
International, Costs and Margins 
International revenues were modelled taking into consideration the expected 
growth rates for the main geographies. Additionally, our Bull case assumes the 
company meets the top of the guidance in terms of gross margin improvements for 
FY’20, both in Food and Clothing & Home. We expect gross margin improvements 
to stagnate at the end of the turnaround plan for C&H, while we model 30% 
accrued synergies from the Ocado transaction to the Food segment from 2021 to 
2023 (recall gross synergies of the transaction total £70mn) (Graphs 27 and 28). 
In what concerns operating costs, M&S distinguishes five key operating costs for 
the UK: store staffing, other store costs, distribution and warehousing and central 
costs (Graph 29). In H1’20, M&S has presented significant confidence on its ability 
to reduce costs, updating guidance for FY’20 from 0-1% cost reduction to 1-2% - 
because of this, and given the company reported -3.3% UK operating costs yoy, 
Graph 27. UK Food Gross Margin 
Evolution, Bull Scenario 
Source: ER Analysis 
Graph 28. UK C&H Gross Margin 
Evolution, Bull Scenario 
Source: ER Analysis 
Graph 25. Share of Online in UK 
C&H, Bull Scenario 
Source: ER Analysis 
Graph 26. Share of Online in UK 
C&H, Bull Scenario 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
 








despite the introduction of IFRS 16, we are confident the company will be able to 
reduce pressure in its cost base. As such, we think the current cost cutting 
measures are bearing fruit and our modelling assumptions estimate an overall 
reduction of UK operating costs between 2020 and 2022, with the most relevant 
decrease in FY’21; afterwards, costs are growing at an average growth rate of 
0.4% until 2031 driven mostly by higher maintenance costs associated to sales 
increases.  
Additionally, we model improvements in terms of operating margins for the 
International segment for the upcoming 5 years following company’s store closure 
and reshifting towards a smaller and higher sales density stores. We also model 
adjustments28 related with the strategic turnaround plan, that are decreasing during 
the years of the plan (Graph 30). 
Our assumptions emphasize we are confident on the company’s ability to become 
more efficient in terms of bottom line; our concerns lie on the company’s ability to 
fight topline adversities and the modelling of our investment case refects this belief. 
Regardless, while we estimate the company finely balances its cost structure, its 
increasing dependency on the Food segment results in an overall margin 
deterioration – Food is margin dilutive (Graphs 31 and 32). In 2031, overall operating 
margin is at a c.3% level, in line with other Food peers.  
Valuation  
EV/Equity Bridge 
M&S provides its employees access to the UK Defined Pension Scheme. The 
amount of surplus recognized as of FY’21 - which totals £632m - was added from 
the enterprise value to get a fairer valuation. 
Furthermore, Ocado29 must be taken into consideration when computing the equity 
value. Since M&S only acquired the Retail division of Ocado, it was difficult to 
estimate how much of the market value would indeed represent this segment. 
Hence, an individual valuation of the Retail business was conducted and it was the 
amount of the Equity Value obtained that was considered for the stake in 
Associates; Ocado’s equity value was added to the Enterprise Value as the 
partnership could be liquidated to repay debt, hence has a similar treatment to 
cash.  
 
28 Adjustments related with Strategic Programmes, M&S Bank’s credit impairments, among others  
29 Investment will be accounted as an associate 
Graph 31. UK Sales Mix, Bull 
Scenario 
Source: ER Analysis 
Graph 32. Group’s Operating 
Margin Evolution, Bull Scenario 
Source: ER Analysis 
Graph 30. Group’s Adjustments 
Source: ER Analysis 
Graph 29. UK Op. Costs Change YoY 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
 








No other adjustments were considered as no other relevant balance or off-balance 
sheet items were identified (Figure 3). 
 
WACC 
Since M&S has its operational activity divided into international and domestic 
markets, 2 different WACCs were estimated. The rational was the same for both, 
and the international peers were selected considering the geographical areas M&S 
has, or intends to have in the future, more operations. In international WACC, 
peers from Germany, France and India were selected, which can fairly represent 
the diversity of countries where M&S has its operations. Final WACC was 
calculated using a weighted average of the international and domestic WACCs, 
considering the core business revenues (Table 17).  
Cost of equity 
The cost of equity was estimated considering 6 M&S’s peers, both for domestic 
and international markets. These were selected based on the raw beta, since a 
comparable with a raw beta completely different from M&S would not be a good 
estimator for our forecast. Raw betas were calculated based on the last 5 years of 
monthly data for closing prices of each stock. The unlevered beta of the industry 
was estimated by the weighted average of each stock’s beta by market 
capitalization (Table 18). In this formula, we used the UK 10Y Government Bond as 
a proxy for risk-free and the annualized average return of the peers as market 
return.  
Cost of Debt 
We reached an estimated cost of debt of 1.79%30 (Table 19). The estimated bond 
rating was A2, given the company’s FY’19 EBIT and interest expenses.  
Given it is not expected that the interest coverage ratio significantly changes, we 
estimate the bond’s rating will remain constant, and therefore the cost of debt. 
 
30 Using the formula Cost of Debt = Risk-free + Default spread + Country Default Spread 
Table 17. WACC Calculation 





Core Business Revenues 9441 937 10377
Beta Unlevered 0.68 0.54 0.67
Beta Levered 1.19 0.91 1.16
Market Return 9.18% 17.34% 9.91%
Risk-Free 0.50% 1.96% 0.63%
Cost of Equity 10.83% 15.98% 11.29%
Cost of Debt 1.79% 1.79% 1.79%
Tax Rate 19% 30% 30%
D/(D+E) 38% 38% 38%
E/(D+E) 62% 62% 62%
WACC 7.29% 10.43% 7.57%
Table 19. Cost of Debt 
Source: ER Analysis 
EBIT 2019 601
Current interest expenses 112
Current LT gov. bond rate 0.50%
Country risk premium 0.69%
Risk free rate -0.19%
Interest  coverage ratio 5.39
Estimated Bond Rating A2/A
Estimated Company Default Spread 1.4%
Estimated County Default Spread 0.60%
Estimated Cost of Debt 1.8%
Book Value of Straight Debt 2,113
Average Maturity 14.19
Market Value of Debt 3,031
Figure 3. EV – Equity Bridge 
Source: ER Analysis 
Since M&S reports in March, time value corresponds in the update to Dec-20 values 
Table 18. Bu Calculation 
Source: ER Analysis 
UK





MARKS AND SPENCER 3338 -12.38% 0.88 0.43
TESCO PLC 23005 4.75% 1.15 0.63
NEXT PLC 793 1.96% 0.90 0.09
OCADO GROUP PLC 9290 38.98% 0.97 0.97
ASOS PLC 2018 8.76% 1.47 1.32
B&M EUROPEAN VALUE RETAIL 3868 9.67% 0.77 0.52
WH SMITH PLC 2699 12.50% 0.63 0.39
0.68
International






TRENT 1946 33.62% 0.80 1.07
TITAN COMPANY 10706 29.50% 0.83 0.80
JLA INFRAVILLE SHOPPERS LTD 678 55.86% 2.28 2.18
Rest of Europe
CARREFOUR 10573 -7.16% 0.88 0.30
CASINO GUICHARD 4178 -8.41% 0.98 0.38













Capital structure was forecasted based on the domestic peers. For reasons of 
consistency, international peers were not considered since some of them, namely 
the emerging markets ones, are in a completely different steady-state position from 
M&S, and the domestic operational activity of the company is still very 
concentrated in the UK. Indeed, the majority of the international peers have 
completely different capital structures compared to M&S (Table 20). For consistency, 
the same peers were used to estimate the future capital structure of the company. 
Thus, it is assumed that M&S’s future capital structure converges to the industry 
average. This ratio was calculated by a weighted average of the capital structure 
and company market capitalization.  
Fine Tuning Our Valuation  
Understanding the risks behind a SELL recommendation, we conducted both a 
scenario analysis and a multiples valuation, allowing us to triangulate the TP as of 
Dec-2020 for M&S. 
Scenario Analysis 
We have built three scenarios, which besides covering the different topics guided 
by the company, incorporates our assumptions on the overall performance of the 
company (Attachment 1).  
General Assumptions 
Despite the several specific assumptions to the several scenarios, there are 
underlying conceptions to all the three scenarios.  
• The strategic programme leads to an overall revamp of food revenues. In the 
first years, modest growth is driven by negative space contribution following 
the closure of 15 stores (net value) as of FY’23; 
• Positive LFL with  drivers changing throughout the years: initially, following the 
reduction in discounting and an overall decrease in prices, prices are not 
expected to contribute until FY’23 and c.0.5% from 2023 onwards; 
• C&H revenues decline during the transformation plan mostly driven by the fact 
that M&S is not able to meet fashion standards vs fast-retailer, materializing in 
negative space contribution following store closures; 
• Sales recapture from closure and resizing slowing from c.20% to 0% in 2031 
as we expect decreasing synergies from store closures; 
• Online key driver until 2025 for C&H. 
in billions Market Cap D/(D+E)
MARKS AND SPENCER GROUP 3,338 55.9%
TESCO PLC 23,005 50.2%
NEXT PLC 793 92.0%
OCADO GROUP PLC 9,290 0.0%
ASOS PLC 2,018 12.4%
B&M EUROPEAN VALUE RETAIL S.A. 3,868 36.6%
WH SMITH PLC 2,699 43.1%
Weighted Average 37.7%
Table 20. Capital Structure 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
 









The scenario analysis covers topics from each segment’s revenues to gross 
margins and balance sheet (i.e., inventories, CAPEX, etc) and aligns the overall 
growth rate of the company with the terminal FCF average from 2028 to 2031 (i.e., 
for the Base and Bear scenarios, growth rate at +0% and in the Bull case, at 1.5%). 
The results from our analysis as well as the drivers are highlighted in Attachment 
1. Overall, in the bull scenario, TP as of Dec-20 could reach as high as 190, 
implying 13% downside vs the price at 19 December 2019 or as low as 106, 




We have identified 3 key comparable groups: (1) UK Food Retailers, in which we 
include Tesco, Morrison and Sainsbury, (2) European Food Retailers, which 
comprise Ahold Delhaize, Carrefour, Colruyt and Casino Guichard, which are 
peers with an international presence and that display similar gross margins to M&S 
and (3) UK General Merchandising Retailers, which include Next, Kingfisher, 
Sports Direct, JD Sports, Dunelm Group and B&M. Looking at 1-year forward 
multiples31, our analysis implies Marks & Spencer trades at 0.4x EV/Revenues, 
7.2x EV/EBIT and 9.2x P/E. The conclusions of the valuation are presented in 
Figure 4, which emphasized our SELL recommendation, with M&S showing more 




31 This is, using Bloomberg “EEO” function to obtain CSS and compute implied multiples for each peer group 
Bull Base Bear
PT Dec-20 190 147 106
Implied Downside as of 
19-Dec-19
-13% -33% -52%
Table 21. Price Targets according to outlined scenarios 
Source: ER Analysis 
Figure 4. Football Field Valuation 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
 








Small Note On Valuation 
While attempting to model the different DCF lines, we tried to identify correlations 
between M&S and its peers and between M&S and the overall industry data. The 
analysis did not provide much colour on the future prospects for M&S as, despite 
being exposed to industry-wide problems, M&S problems are company-specific, 
allowing us to reinstate our SELL recommendation. Additionally, our model does 
not account for the impact of IFRS 1632 as this accounting norm has no implications 
on the valuation of the business – the accounting treatment did not change the 
cash generation potential of the company. 
Final Remarks On The Equity Story 
Despite its efforts to become a more updated retailer and to be top-of-mind for the 
British consumer, M&S is deeply struggling with lagging behind competition, 
especially in the Clothing & Home segment. While we agree the company will be 
able to reset its operating cost base (assuming no greater challenges from Brexit), 
we do not expect a major turnaround in the company’s topline. Food represents 
limited upside while Clothing & Home is deteriorating year after year, with no signs 
for possible recovery. As such, and given the lack of potential upside drivers for 




32 In accordance with IFRS 16, the Group will start recognising an expense in respect of leases of low-value items on a straight-line basis over the life of the 
lease. For all other leases, (with the exception of short-term leases less than 12 months which fall outside the scope  of IFRS 16), the Group will recognising 
a right-of-use asset and corresponding liability at the date at which the leased asset is made available for use by the group. 
Bull Base Bear
Food Revenues
 Until 2031, company launches c. 2000 new lines following new 
positioning and Ocado. Company is expected to create 50 new lines 
per year reaching an overall penetration of 80%
Until 2031, company launches c. 1300 new lines following new 
positioning and Ocado. Overall penetration of new lines at 60% in 
the steady-state with 25 new launches from 2027 ownards
Until 2031, company launches c. 1200 new lines following new 
positioning and Ocado. Overall penetration of new lines at 60% with 
25 new launches per year
C&H Revenues
M&S is well succeed in its plan to close 85 stores, ending up 
closing 110 stores until 2027. Regular stores exhibit increasing 
sales density. Underperforming stores with a 1.5% yoy decrease in 
sales densities
M&S is well succeed in its plan to close 85 stores, ending up 
closing 110 stores until 2027. Regular stores exhibit sales density 
growing at 0.5% yoy. Underperforming stores with a 2.5% yoy 
decrease in sales densities
M&S closes 84 stores. Regular stores exhibit stable sales density. 
Underperforming stores with an average 3.0% yoy decrease in 
sales densities
International Revenues 2.5% yoy change until 2024, 1% thereafter 1% yoy change 0% yoy change
Gross Margin Food
Significant improvements in gross margin. Until 2023 and following 
the incorporation of Ocado, 30% of the gross synergies expected to 
accrue to the gross margin; between 2024 and 2025, 15% of 
Ocado’s synergies still accrue to gross margin. Gross margin 
stabilizes at 32.2% in 2025
15% of Ocado's synergies accrue to gross margin with gross margin 
in FY'22 stabilizing at 31.3% in 2023
Gross margin reaches lower-end of guidance at -25 bps and is 
stable from FY'20 ownards at 
Gross Margin C&H
Gross margin performs better than guidance, with an increase of 
+25 bps; +12.5 bps of margin increase until 2023, with margin 
stabilizing at 57.8% 
Stable at FY'19 levels, with margin at 57.1%
M&S reaches bottom guidance in FY20. No synergies accrued from 
Ocado deal. Stabilization margin from 2021 ownards at 56.5%
International Op. Margin Increases +15 bps until 2025; stable from then ownards at 13.9% Stable at FY'19 levels, with margin at 13.6% Stable at FY'19 levels, with margin at 13.6%
Inventory/Receivables/Pay
ables
Increasing efficiency in inventory from year 2020 ownards following 
reduction in store and greater availability translating into lower 
holding period; improvements in relationship with supplers 
increasing time to pay. Capex as a % of sales stabilizing at c.2% in 
line with industry average with investment in PPE at c.3% of sales
No change in efficiency in inventory; improvements in relationship 
w/ supplers increasing time to pay. Depreciation as a % of sales 
decreasing following closure of stores; capex as a % of sales 
stabilizing at c.3%. Capex as a % of sales stabilizing at 3.3% with 
investment in PPE at c.2% of sales
Decrease in efficiency in terms of payables, inventories and 
receivables reflected in increasing holding period and decreasing 
collection period. Capex as a % of sales stabilizing at 3.3% with 
investment in PPE at c.2% of sales
Attachment 1. Scenarios 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
 











GBP in millions 2019a 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e 2026e 2027e 2028e 2029e 2030e 2031e
Food Revenue 5,903 5,886 5,909 5,956 6,027 6,235 6,481 6,663 6,806 6,922 7,039 7,158 7,279
Clothing & Home Revenue 3,537 3,405 3,208 3,014 2,834 2,695 2,583 2,458 2,370 2,300 2,232 2,165 2,101
UK Revenue 9,441 9,291 9,117 8,970 8,861 8,930 9,063 9,120 9,176 9,222 9,271 9,323 9,380
International Revenue 937 936 960 984 1008 1033 1044 1054 1065 1075 1086 1097 1108
Group Revenue 10,377 10,228 10,077 9,954 9,869 9,963 10,107 10,174 10,241 10,297 10,357 10,421 10,488
Food Gross Profit 1,835 1,844 1,863 1,891 1,926 1,999 2,085 2,143 2,189 2,227 2,264 2,303 2,342
Clothing & Home Gross Profit 2,021 1,954 1,845 1,737 1,637 1,557 1,492 1,420 1,369 1,329 1,289 1,251 1,213
UK Gross Profit Statutory 3,856 3,798 3,709 3,628 3,563 3,556 3,577 3,563 3,559 3,555 3,554 3,554 3,555
Logistics Adjustment (385) (385) (379) (374) (371) (375) (380) (383) (385) (387) (390) (392) (394)
UK Gross Profit Adjusted 3,471 3,414 3,330 3,254 3,192 3,181 3,197 3,180 3,173 3,168 3,164 3,162 3,161
Group Gross Profit 3830 3,785 3,734 3,693 3,667 3,702 3,757 3,782 3,808 3,829 3,852 3,877 3,903
Store Staffing (1,045) (1,066) (1,053) (998) (996) (994) (992) (990) (990) (990) (990) (990) (990)
Other Store Costs (950) (929) (912) (897) (886) (886) (906) (912) (918) (922) (927) (932) (938)
Distribution and Warehousing (565) (553) (539) (523) (523) (523) (523) (523) (523) (523) (523) (523) (523)
Marketing (155) (171) (188) (206) (226) (245) (262) (276) (282) (282) (282) (282) (282)
Central Costs (695) (691) (688) (684) (684) (684) (684) (684) (684) (684) (684) (684) (684)
Food & C&H Op. Costs (3,410) (3,410) (3,380) (3,309) (3,316) (3,333) (3,369) (3,386) (3,398) (3,403) (3,408) (3,413) (3,418)
Food & C&H Op. Profit Stat. 446 388 329 319 247 223 208 177 160 153 146 141 137
Logistics Adjustment 385 385 379 374 371 375 380 383 385 387 390 392 394
Adjusting Items (400) (248) (124) (62) (31) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Food & C&H Op. Profit Adj. 46 140 205 257 216 223 208 177 160 153 146 141 137
M&S Bank Op. Profit 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Adjusting Items (21) (21) (21) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M&S Bank Op. Profit Adjusted 7 7 7 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
M&S Energy Op. Profit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK Operating Profit Statutory 474 416 356 347 275 250 236 205 188 180 174 168 164
UK Op. Profit Adjusted 53 146 211 285 244 250 236 205 188 180 174 168 164
Statutory International Oper. Profit 127 126 129 132 136 139 140 142 143 145 146 147 149
Adjusting Items (17)
International Operating Profit 110 126 129 132 136 139 140 142 143 145 146 147 149
Group Operating Profit Statutory 601 541 485 479 411 389 376 347 331 325 320 316 313
Group Operating Profit Adjusted 162 272 340 417 380 389 376 347 331 325 320 316 313
Finance Income 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Finance Costs (112) (114) (92) (81) (74) (77) (78) (79) (83) (84) (86) (86) (86)
Statutory Profit Before Tax 523 462 428 432 371 346 332 301 282 274 268 264 261
Adj. Profit Before Tax 85 192 283 370 340 346 332 301 282 274 268 264 261
Reported Taxes (47) (41) (40) (46) (40) (37) (35) (32) (29) (28) (27) (27) (26)
Reported Net Income 476 421 388 386 330 309 297 269 253 246 241 237 235
Total Ajustments (439) (269) (145) (62) (31) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adj. Net Income 37 152 243 324 299 309 297 269 253 246 241 237 235
Other Comprehensive Income, net of tax 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Comprehensive Income 53 168 259 340 315 325 313 285 269 262 256 252 251
Attachment 2. Balance Sheet 
Source: ER Analysis 
Attachment 3.  Income Statement 
Source: ER Analysis 
Core
GBP in millions 2019a 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e 2026e 2027e 2028e 2029e 2030e 2031e
Operating Cash 156 102 101 100 99 100 101 102 102 103 104 104 105
Inventories 700 729 667 640 634 638 642 644 646 646 650 653 657
Trade Receivables 523 504 497 491 487 491 498 513 516 519 522 525 529
Tax Receivables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PP&E 4,029 3,769 3,618 3,560 3,590 3,616 3,661 3,694 3,716 3,729 3,733 3,727 3,714
Intangibles 420 376 357 352 358 373 385 394 400 406 410 414 417
Goodwill & Brands 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Trade Payables & Other Payables (1,784) (1,759) (1,734) (1,713) (1,699) (1,716) (1,741) (1,771) (1,783) (1,789) (1,800) (1,811) (1,822)
Provisions (399) (399) (399) (399) (399) (399) (399) (399) (399) (399) (399) (399) (399)
Other Taxes Payables (26) (26) (34) (29) (30) (31) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
Deferred Tax Assets/Liabilities (218) (239) (215) (212) (182) (172) (166) (153) (146) (144) (141) (140) (138)
Core Business Invested Capital 3,481 3,138 2,938 2,870 2,938 2,981 3,032 3,073 3,104 3,121 3,128 3,125 3,113
Non-Core
GBP in millions 2019a 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e 2026e 2027e 2028e 2029e 2030e 2031e
Investments 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Investments in Affiliates 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Derivative Assets/(Liabilities) 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172
Non-Core Business Invested Capital 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221
Net Operating Assets 3,702 3,359 3,159 3,091 3,159 3,203 3,253 3,295 3,325 3,343 3,350 3,346 3,334
Financials
GBP in millions 2019a 2020e 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e 2026e 2027e 2028e 2029e 2030e 2031e
Financial Liabilities (1,793) (1,445) (1,280) (1,166) (1,212) (1,224) (1,255) (1,305) (1,334) (1,351) (1,358) (1,355) (1,343)
Excess Cash 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Post-retirement Benefits/(Liabilities) 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642
Net Financial Assets (1,021) (803) (638) (524) (570) (582) (613) (663) (692) (709) (716) (713) (701)
Equity 2,681 2555 2521 2567 2589 2621 2640 2632 2633 2634 2634 2634 2633
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Following its entry in the Online Groceries market, Marks & Spencer has 
entered a joint-venture agreement with Ocado Retail Group Plc. In the current 
paper, the potential of the joint-venture is analysed. Firstly, it is attempted to 
conclude if Marks & Spencer overpaid for the agreement. Secondly, it is 
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Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) and POR Norte 
(Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209). 
Motivation 
In February 2019, Marks & Spencer announced the creation of a joint-venture (JV) with Ocado 
Group Plc (“Ocado”). With M&S’s stock down c.12% on the day of the announcement, bulls 
and bears are monitoring closely the developments of this partnership as it marks the company’s 
definite shift towards an omnichannel model. Hence, the current analysis attempts to (1) assess 
the implied valuation of Ocado and (2) discuss the overall implications for M&S’s valuation 
from the new partnership. 
Company Overview 
Trading on the London Stock Exchange since 2010, Ocado is a UK pure play online grocery 
retailer that operates via 2 segments – Solutions (8% of FY19 revenues) and Retail (92% of 
FY19 revenues). Through the Retail segment, Ocado reaches British consumers via its online 
platform, Ocado.com, offering them c.54,000 products. Leveraging on the expertise and data 
gathered from Retail, Ocado runs its Solutions segment - the company operates as an e-
commerce partner, helping retail partners from several places of the world by using Ocado’s 
technology to develop its front-end interface. Under Solutions, each retail partner typically 
retains control of its customers and offers its own assortment and branded products. 
Following its objective to enter the online groceries market, M&S is acquiring a 50% stake of 
Ocado’s UK Retail business, signing an agreement with the Solutions business via the Ocado 
Smart Platform. The agreement consists in the payment of a £750m consideration, which 
includes a deferred consideration of up to £187.5m plus interest, upon the meeting of targets 
not disclosed. The transaction will become effective in September 2020.  
Assessing The Transaction Value  
Comparable Transactions Analysis  
Firstly, to get a sense of (1) industry trends and (2) implied transaction values, a comparable 
transaction analysis was conducted. Several transactions were analysed, among which: 
Figure 1: Comparable Transactions Identified as of Dec-2019 
Given lack of data, it was not possible to collect information on the terms of each deal; also, in 
terms of deals, it was only possible to get revenue figures. The multiples of the transactions 
with publicly available information are presented in Figure 2. At first look at past transactions, 
Ocado seems to have been significantly cheaper than other similar players. However, there are 
some aspects to consider. Firstly, the transactions highlighted are both cash and stock while the 
Ocado-M&S deal is purely equity; with the premium in stock transactions being typically 
higher than all-cash transactions, we would expect Ocado’s overall valuation to be higher than 
the other transactions analysed. Secondly, given the different stage of the retailer’s value chain 
each player operates, the one transaction in which peers are more comparable to M&S is indeed 
the one between Ahold Delhaize1 and bol.com2. And the transaction is exactly the one which is 
in-line with the underlying multiple associated with the transaction in analysis. Given the 
specificities of each deal, it would be deceiving to assume the comparable analysis transaction 
could sustain a conclusion by itself.  






Walmart acquires Jet.com USD3300m USD550m 6.0x 100% 
Ahold Delhaize acquires bol.com EUR350m EUR355m 1.0x 100% 
Takeaway.com acquires Delivery Hero's German USD70m USD37.5m 1.9x 100% 
Marks & Spencer acquires Ocado EUR750m EUR808m 0.9x 50% 
vs Median   -0.9x  
vs Average   -2.0x  
Figure 2: Comparable Transactions Analysis as of Dec-2019 
 
1 Leading food retailer in the Netherlands 
2 Leading online platform in the Netherlands for books, electronics and toys 
Date Acquirer Target Description 
05/08/2014 UK Retail Grocer Online Book Community 
Sainsbury acquires Anobii . Acquisition of 64% of the e-book platform 
HarperCollins and Penguin Random House stakes in Anovi for £1 
31/03/2015 
German Retail and 
Tourism Group 
Cloud Commerce Platform REWE acquires commercetools. Acquisition of 100% 






Walmart acquires Jet.com. Acquisition for $3 billion in cash, a portion of 










C2C Meal Ordering Services 
Alibaba acquires Ele.me. Acquisition of all outstanding shares of Ele.me 
(already held 43% of Ele.me) for $9.5bn 
12/04/2018 UK Retail Conglomerate Swiss E-commerce Retailer 
Siroop acquired Coop from Swisscom. Coop and Swisscom jointly launched 
Siroop 
17/11/2018 Dutch Grocer Online Retailer Ahold Delhaize acquires bol.com. Acquisition of 100% for EUR350mn 
21/12/2018 
Dutch Food Delivery 
Platform 
German Food Delivery 
Platform 
Takeaway.com acquires Delivery Hero's German. Acquisition of an 18% 




Dutch Online Supermarket 
Edeka increases stake in Picnic. Acquisition of 15% stake (already owned 
20%) 
25/10/2019 Food Delivery Platform Food Delivery Platform Foodhub buys Big Foodie 
DCF Analysis  
The DCF analysis implied a thorough analysis of Ocado and led to an overall valuation of 
£1.019 equity value (assuming a WACC of 7.6% and a terminal growth of 2.45% from 2030 
onwards). Such valuation implies the impact in M&S’s equity value is £509, reflecting c. 22% 
downside vs the amount paid (excluding the delayed consideration). In the current paper, the 
underlying assumptions of the Base Scenario are presented. 
Ocado’s Retail business model works purely online, meaning the company does not own nor 
operate physical stores, solely reaching the consumer via Ocado.com. Since the company’s 
ability to generate revenues depends on its warehousing capacity, revenues were modelled 
taking into consideration the capacity per week of each customer fulfilment centre (CFC), 
capacity utilization and an average order size. In specific, the following was assumed to obtain 
the capacity of each CFC: 
 Description Assumption 
CFC1 - Hatfield Started operating in 2002 with capacity for 165 orders per week.  Since it is operating for so long, assumed entire capacity is available 
CFC2 - Dordon Started operating in 2013 with capacity for 190 orders per week.  Since it is operating for so long, assumed entire capacity if available. 
CFC3 - Andover 
Built in 2016 with capacity for 30 orders per week. Suffered a fire in 
2019 and capacity was not at its full at the time of the event.  
Not expected to open in 2020; expected to reach full capacity of 65 orders per 
week in 2021. 
CFC4 - Erith Started operating in 2019 with only half capacity availability.  Overall capacity of 70 orders per week to be available in 2020. 
CFC5 - Purfleet In construction.  
Expected to start operating in 2021 with only half capacity available. Overall 
capacity of 85 orders per week fully available in 2022 
CFC6 - Bristol Announced.  
Expected to start operating in 2022 with only half capacity available. Overall 
capacity of 85 orders per week available in 2022 
Figure 3: Ocado’s CFC Capacity Availability as of 2019 
Following Ocado’s plans to open more customer fulfilment centres of smaller size, it was 
assumed each year the company will be adding 15 orders per week to Ocado’s capacity – the 
equivalent to adding a mini-CFC (similar to Bristol) which is only fully operational in year 2 
to the company’s weekly capacity. On top of this and following Morrisons ending the 
partnership with Ocado3 and partnering with Amazon, it was assumed not all capacity was 
allocated to M&S (instead to Morrisons) but also that such capacity is decreasing throughout 
time. Costs were modelled taking into consideration the company’s impact in gross margin 
 
3 Morrisons is one of Ocado’s Solutions clients. Under the partnership, Morrisons shares capacity with Ocado’s retail segment in some of the 
British CFCs 
following the end of the payment of the sourcing fees to Waitrose, implying +99 bps in FY’20. 
Additionally, given Ocado’s major operating costs are associated with the CFCs and Trunking 
and Delivery, these lines were modelled assuming the company will obtain economies of scale, 
which translate in efficiency gains until 2023, stable from then onwards. Capital expenditures 
were modelled as a function of sales (since sales are a function of CFCs). 
At this point, information on customer loyalty following the end of the agreement with Waitrose 
and the ability to integrate businesses is still unknown; as such, this valuation can be considered 
fairly optimistic as it accounts for little negative impact from the transition. Overall, the little 
disruption from the deal provides a fairly reasonable valuation following the risks associated 
with a SELL recommendation on Marks & Spencer and allows to conclude the UK retailer 
overpaid for the deal. 
Running More Numbers 
To finance the transaction, M&S announced both a dividend reset of 40% (with dividend falling 
from 18.7p to 13.9p) as well as a rights issue. While it is understandable such transaction 
implies financial discipline from M&S, it would be expected the company would compensate 
its investors for their patience in a context in which its stock deteriorating performance. A 
dividend reset certainly resonates in the mind’s of M&S’s investors as, historically, dividends 
are fairly stable at least since 2010. 
Figure 3: M&S’s dividend per share. Excludes special dividend of 6.4p paid in 2017 
If we run the numbers we get that the transaction was able to finance c. £600mn and the dividend 
reset a further c.£60m. In this scenario, one could raise its concerns over management’s beliefs, 
with the rights issue to finance the transaction not being enough for the company. Alternatively, 
following management’s revamping of capital expenditure to £350mn (from 3% of total group 
sales to 3.5%), investors could become even more worried on the high level of invested capital. 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
DPS 15.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 18.0 18.7 18.7 18.7 18.7 13.9 
% 
 13.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -25.7% 
Overall, the (1) financing method, which consisted in an undersubscribed rights issue4, (2) the 
dividend cut and (3) increasing capital expenditures combined can lead to increasing investors’ 
mistrust – and, indeed, on the day of the announcement, Marks & Spencer’s stock price 
decreased by more than the equivalent value of the expected gross synergies generated 
following the agreement (£70mn).  
It is about reputation 
M&S is full of soft spots. With a Food business not promising major upturns and a declining 
Clothing & Home segment, the company is lacking real growth drivers. Lagging behind 
competition, the company fails to (1) conquer its consumer and (2) build trust with its investors. 
M&S has become reactive, rather than proactive, in a market that fights for thin margins. 
Entering the online market, years after its competitors were playing cards, is nothing but a 
desperate move to provide some signs of life. If the agreement with Ocado was golden, then we 
would expect Waitrose to bid to enter as well, instead of partnering with Amazon. The price is 
only indicative of a desperate management team with little growth opportunities to make the 
business thrive, ignoring the significant execution risks of the transaction. As such, the current 
analysis only reinstates the belief on the SELL recommendation. 
In the end of the day, Marks & Spencer paid for the transaction with the loss of investors’ trust. 
Volatility will follow. Was it really worth it? 
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